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Environmental Law- Air Pollution Abatement -
A Supplemental Damage Remedy Under
the Clean Air Act
Air pollution adversely affects man and his environ-
ment in many ways. It soils his home and interferes with
the growth of plants and shrubs. It diminishes the value
of his agricultural products. It obscures his view and adds
unpleasant smells to his environment. Most important it
endangers his health.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Air pollution has been a part of man's environment since primi-
tive cave dwellers first built a fire. Only in the past decade or two,
however, has man awakened to its menace. Indeed, air pollution has
become so much a part of the American lifestyle that young children
in many of our large cities have never experienced the sensation of
breathing air free of industrial odors. Rarely have these children
viewed the sun unobscured by a pall of smog.2 Many urban dwellers
have become so inured to air pollution that it is accepted without
question. Congestion and burning eyes are resignedly viewed as in-
evitable by-products of an industrial age.
Air pollution affects mankind in a multitude of ways. First and
foremost, it damages health. Persons living in urban areas show twice
as high an incidence of lung cancer as those in non-urban areas.3
The death rate from emphysema has increased by over five hundred
percent during the past fifteen years, with the major increases coming
in heavily polluted urban centers.4 Moreover, various other disorders
are increasingly being linked to air pollution.5 It has been estimated
that 110,000 deaths occur in the United States each year that are at
least partially attributable to air pollution.6
' Remarks of Senator Edmund Muskie, introducing the Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970 to the Senate. 116 CoNo. REc. S16,102 (daily ed. Sept. 21,
1970).
2It has been estimated that 40% of Chicago's sunlight and 25% of New
York's is cut off by air pollution. Pollution, LwrE, Feb. 7, 1969, at 38.
3The lungs of residents of heavily polluted urban areas may be affected
as extensively as those of a two package per day cigarette smoker. Nailing
Lung Cancer to Air Pollution, ScI. NEws, Sept. 16, 1972, at 183.
4Emphysema is now the fastest growing cause of death in the United
States. Briehl, Air Polution, AmmcA, May 17, 1969, at 581.5 Certain pollutants are thought to cause or aggravate such disorders as
skin cancer, dermatitis, hyperpigmentation, and acne. Nailing Lung Cancer to
Air Pollution, supra note 3.
6 Briehl, supra note 4.
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Beyond damage to health, the destruction to property is also
considerable. President Lyndon Johnson estimated the economic costs
of air pollution at eleven billion dollars annually.7 The typical sub-
urban homeowner probably spends from two to three hundred dollars
per year to repair the damage caused by pollution.8
In 1968 alone, 143 million tons of particles emitted into the air
fell back on America9 creating serious smog problems in nearly every
major United States city.'0 The Environmental Protection Agency re-
ported that the number of serious smog incidents in the summer of
1972 may have set a new record." When these massive emissions of
particles are combined with a thermal inversion, the potential for mass
death is great.'2 Air pollution creates a further problem that is not as
readily perceived. According to a Public Health Service survey, the
amount of sunlight reaching the earth is seriously curtailed by air
pollution.'3 How this will affect climatic conditions can only be sur-
mised.
7 This figure is exclusive of medical costs. Such economic damages include:
(1) The corrosion of industrial and building materials; (2) the destruction of
paint and exterior materials on homes and other buildings; (3) the more fre-
quent need for cleaning; (4) the reduction of real estate values due to urban
decay; (5) increased rust and dirt on automobiles; and (6) the destruction
of recreational areas. Id. at 580.
8Id.
9 Pollution, supra note 2, at 39.
10 In a typical large city, twenty tons of dust per month fall on each square
mile. Briehl, supra note 4, at 580. The cities are not the only areas adversely
affected. In many regions, farm production is suffering. Certain crops will no
longer grow in particular regions of the country. In Maryland, for example,
farm productivity has been reduced by 20%-25% because of the effects of air
pollution. If You Think Smog Has Been Bad-, U.S. NEws & WonLD REP.,
Oct. 16, 1972, at 80.
"1 The greatest danger areas are the cities of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts
and those in certain parts of Texas. In Houston, for example, smog exceeded
minimum federal health standards 34% of the time in May and 12.8% of the
time in June. If You Think Smog Has Been Bad-, supra note 10.
12 A thermal inversion occurs when warm air is trapped under a layer of
cold air close to the surface. This inversion acts as a lid on upward motions
of the air below. Consequently, diffusion upward of pollutants (dust, smoke,
etc.) is extremely limited. If the inversion lingers, pollutants may build up in
massive amounts. Under these conditions, great potential for environmental
disaster exists. Such an inversion led to the infamous air pollution incident in
Donora, Pennsylvania. During the last week of October, 1948, the town of
Donora experienced a thermal inversion that lasted for nearly a week. Emis-
sions for the town's large steel plant built up in the limited air space under
the inversion. The average number of deaths in Donora had previously been
two per week, but on October 30 and 31 alone nineteen persons died. Over
5900 people (42.7% of the population) became ill, mostly with respiratory
disorders. Eighty percent of persons with previous chronic disease were ad-
versely affected. Hodgson, Acute Health Effects Induced by Commonly Occur-
ring Nonepisodic Levels of Urban Air Pollution, 48 J. Una. L. 657 (1971).
13 This problem is discussed in note 2, supra.
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In a few areas of the country, effective steps have been taken to
curtail pollution,' 4 but, for the most part, public officials have reacted
sluggishly to the problem. Legislation has, so far, been ineffective in
the majority of cases, and it remains to be seen whether the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970'1 can solve the problem. At present, timely
compliance with the standards established pursuant to the Amend-
ments is extremely unlikely.' 6
The earth is a remarkable ecosystem that can absorb vast quanti-
ties of pollutants with little or no adverse effect, but even nature is
not infinite. This note accepts the basic premise that air pollution
poses a serious problem that can be cured only through a compre-
hensive body of legislation, enforced by agencies adequately staffed,
funded, and motivated. Still, private citizens, through legal action,
can play a crucial role in the area of motivation. Thus far, however,
private use of the courts has had little effect on pollution control.
Essentially, this note can be divided into two parts: (1) A sur-
vey of existing pollution remedies along with a look at promising
new theories; and (2) the suggestion that the nucleus of a compre-
hensive air pollution remedy lies within the "Citizen suits" provision
of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.'1 The suggestion is specula-
tive but firmly grounded in judicial precedent. If pollution is to be
141n November, 1971, the Environmental Protection Agency went to
court to force Birmingham's largest polluters to curtail emissions. The city's
pollution problem in 1972 was greatly improved over the crisis conditions that
existed in 1971. If You Think Smog Has Been Bad-, supra note 10.
Is 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
16The Clean Air Act Cuts More Teeth, BusinEss WEEK, May 8, 1971, at
18. New York, for example, will have to take major steps to decrease its
pollution to acceptable levels within the time limits established pursuant to
the Act. The table below indicates the scope of the problem:
LEVEL
REQUrMED BY
PoLrrANr 1970 LEvEL* 1975
Sulfur Oxide 238 80
Particulates 130 75
Nitrogen Oxide 220 100
Carbon Monoxide 37,000 10,000
Photochemical Oxidants 248 160
Hydrocarbons Not Available 160
* Highest average reading at any of New York's 38 monitoring stations.
All figures are micrograms of pollutants per cubic meter of air.
Data: Environmental Protection Agency, New York City's Environmental
Protection Administration.
'742 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970). For the text of the "Citizen suits" pro-
vision, see note 62, infra.
[Vol. 75
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curtailed, citizens must take a more active part. In effect, they must
assume the role of private attorneys-general. The courts must be
willing to discern new methods by which interested citizens can en-
force existing laws. The Clean Air Amendments provide one such
opportunity for the private enforcement necessary to make anti-
pollution legislation effective.
II. THE TRADITIONAL REMEDIS
The common law did not leave the injured victim of air pollution
totally defenseless, though it may often have seemed so. The three
basic common law remedies were nuisance, trespass, and negligence.
A fourth, less common remedy - strict liability for an ultrahazardous
activity - will also be examined briefly.
A. Nuisance
Common law nuisance is by far the most common remedy
available to air pollution victims. Air pollution has been considered
capable of constituting a nuisance since at least 1611.18 Thus, a con-
siderable body of law should have developed by the present day.
However, the numerous difficulties inherent in maintaining a nuisance
action for air pollution have greatly inhibited the effectiveness of the
remedy.19
Traditionally, nuisance has been divided into two areas - public
nuisance and private nuisance. A public nuisance is criminal in na-
18William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611). The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had erected a "hogstye" so near plaintiff's house as
to corrupt the air. The court held that an action on the case was proper and
awarded damages to the plaintiff. In supporting its decision, the court offered
the following hypothetical situation: "And the building of a lime kiln is good
and profitable; but if it be built so near a house, that when it burns the smoke
thereof enters the house, so that none can dwell there, an action lies for it."
Id. at 820.
19A major difficulty in maintaining such an action is defining the term
nuisance. William Prosser has stated:
There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law
than that which surrounds the word "nuisance." It has meant all
things to all men, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything
from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie. There
is general agreement that it is incapable of any exact or compre-
hensive definition.
W. PRossER, HANDBOOn OF THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971) [herein-
after cited as PROssER].
One case has held that nuisance law "is a definition of the dividing line be-
tween the right of any owner to use his property as he so desires and the
recognition of that right in another." Roberts v. C. F. Adams & Sons, 199
Okla. 369, 371, 184 P.2d 634, 637 (1947).
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ture, offering no individual recourse to the courts.20 To constitute a
public nuisance, the polluting source must interfere generally with all
persons wtihin a certain defined area.2 ' Since a public nuisance is
criminally actionable, the state is the proper party to abate the nui-
sance, and, when government officials fail to act, those adversely
affected by the alleged nuisance are left virtually without a remedy.
Under some circumstances, however, an individual can maintain
an action in tort for a public nuisance. The party seeking to bring the
action must have suffered "damage of a special character, distinct
from the injury suffered by the public generally. '2  As a result of
this policy of the common law, unless a special injury converts a
public nuisance into a private nuisance as to the individual specially
affected, the sole responsibility for remedying public nuisance rests
with public officials. In the case of air pollution, where the polluter
is of great financial worth to the community, such nuisances often go
unabated, and the public is left to suffer discomfort and injury in
frustrated silence.
Unlike public nuisances, private nuisances are actionable by in-
dividual citizens. A private nuisance, unlike a nuisance of a public
nature, involves one or a few individuals who have suffered a particu-
lar and distinct injury, not suffered by the public at large, caused by
an invasion of their property rights.2
20 Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig Furniture Co., 34 W. Va. 804, 807, 12
S.E. 1085, 1086 (1891), distinguished between public and private nuisancethusly: COMMON [PUBLIC] NUISANCE: A common nuisance affects
the people at large, and is an offence against the State, but an action
may be brought in his own name by any one who suffers damage
peculiar in kind or degree beyond what is common to him and to
others.
PRIVATE NUISANCE: A private nuisance affects one or more
as private citizens, and not as a part of the public, and is ground
for a civil suit only.
For a general discussion of the two remedies, see 1 V. YANNAcONn, JR., B.
CoHEN, & S. DAvisoN, ENVMRONMENtAL RIGHTs AND RniM ms 77 (1972)[hereinafter cited as YANNACONE, COHEN, & DAvisoN].2 1 YANNACONE, CoHEN, & DAVIsoN, supra note 20, at 78. A public nui-
sance need not injure all persons to the same degree. For example, a factory
that pollutes the air to such an extent as to cause discomfort to the residents
of a town may constitute a public nuisance.22d. at 81. The injury suffered by the complainant must be different in
kind, not merely in degree, from that suffered by the rest of the class affected.
International Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W. Va. 888, 30 S.E.2d 537 (1944);
Davis v. Spragg, 72 W. Va. 672, 79 S.E. 652 (1913); Pence v. Bryant, 54
W. Va. 263, 46 S.E. 275 (1903); Hale v. Town of Weston, 40 W. Va. 313,
21 S.E. 742 (1895).23Private nuisance has been defined as:
any wrongful act which destroys or deteriorates the property of an
270 [Vol. 75
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Theoretically, private nuisance would seem to be a promising
path for the environmental attorney to follow. In practice, a number
of pitfalls limits its effectiveness. The interference with an individual's
property rights necessary to sustain an action for private nuisance
must be both substantial and unreasonable. 24 What is substantial and
unreasonable differs greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.21
An environmental nuisance case faces two further tests: (1)
Does a decrease in the quality of the environment represent a sub-
stantial interference with the use and enjoyment of land that the law
should recognize?; and (2) if an equitable remedy is sought, does the
need for such relief by the individual outweigh the value to society
of allowing the activity to continue? This second test is often referred
to as "balancing the equities" and is the principle reason why an
action of private nuisance lacks promise as an effective, comprehen-
sive remedy for environmental destruction. In Madison v. Ducktown
Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co.,26 pollutants from defendant's plant pre-
vented plaintiffs from raising crops on their land and destroyed a
quantity of timber. The court refused injunctive relief because it
found that the defendant could not change its operation and would,
if ordered to abate, be forced to shut down, thus removing one-half
of the county tax base and leaving ten thousand persons jobless. In-
stead, the court balanced the equities and awarded damages in lieu
of an injunction. The defendant was, in effect, granted a license to
pollute. Certainly the damage award was proper, but, at least from
the environmentalist's point of view, such damages should have been
incidental to injunctive relief and not a substitute for such relief.
However, the Ducktown position has been accepted by most courts. 27
individual or of a few persons or interferes with their lawful use or
enjoyment thereof, or any act which unlawfully hinders them in the
enjoyment of a common or public right and causes them a special
injury different than that sustained by the general public.
YANNACONE, COHEN, & DAviSON, supra note 20, at 78.24 PpOSSER, supra note 19, at 580; C. Smrrn & R. BovER, SURVEY OF THE
LAw OF PROPERTY 209 (2d ed. 1971).25E.g., Dixie Ice Cream Co. v. Blackwell, 217 Ala. 330, 116 So. 348
(1928) (defendant company's emissions of smoke and soot held to constitute
an actionable nuisance, regardless of the locality); Higgins v. Decorah Produce
Co., 214 Iowa 276, 281, 242 N.W. 109, 111 (1932) (no injunction for alleged
"foul and offensive odors," since city residents must "endure without the right
of legal recourse, annoyances and discomforts ordinarily and necessarily inci-
dent to urban life").
26113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).27 E.g., Stockdale v. Agrico Chem. Co., 340 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Iowa
1972); Koseris v. J. R. Simplot Co., 82 Ida. 263, 352 P.2d 235 (1960). Contra,
Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
In Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 807 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1884), Judge Sawyer stated a position taken by few courts: "[Elvery
6
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Perhaps the Ducktown view can best be attributed to a falla-
cious application of the balancing test. As in Ducktown, the courts
generally balance the harm to the individual plaintiff from the pollu-
tion against the benefit derived by society from allowing the polluter
to continue to operate. Where the polluter is a large plant, employing
many residents of a town or city and performing other services for
the community, this application of the test will almost invariably
result in substituting damages for injunctive relief. This application
of the balancing test is inadequate. The result would perhaps be dif-
ferent if the overall harm to the community from the pollution were
considered, rather than confining the inquiry to the harm suffered by
a particular individual. This more accurate balancing of the equities,
however, has found little acceptance in judicial opinions.
Even assuming the existence of a private nuisance and a reason-
able likelihood that a balancing of the equities will result in complete
relief, numerous defenses exist that further hinder effective justice.
In some jurisdictions a polluter may gain a prescriptive right to main-
tain a private nuisance.28 "Coming to the nuisance," 29 while not gen-
erally a permissible defense,10 may be considered as grounds for
estoppeP' or as a matter to be considered in "balancing the equities." 2
The law of nuisance poses far too many complications to be-
come the basis for an effective and comprehensive pollution abate-
substantial, material right of person or property is entitled to protection against
all the world."28 Dangelo v. McLean Fire Brick Co., 287 F. 14 (6th Cir. 1923); Crump
v. Lambert (1867) 3 L.R. Eq. 409, 413. Contra, Ralston v. United Verde
Copper Co., 37 F.2d 180 (D. Ariz. 1929), afd, 46 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1931).
A prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance is similar to an easement and may
be obtained where the nuisance has continued over a long period of time with-
out protest by affected parties. Originally, the use of the easement must have
commenced so far back in time that no one could remember its origin. In
West Virginia, however, the current time fixed for gaining a prescriptive right
is prima facie the statutory period for the recovery of real property. Wool-
dridge v. Coughlin, 46 W. Va. 345, 33 SM. 233 (1899). Thus, presumably,
a prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance may be established by the running
of the ten year statute of limitations prescribed in W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 2,
§ 1 (Michie 1966).29 Where a person acquires property which, to his knowledge, is adversely
affected by another's activity, he has no standing to complain about damage
to his person or property. Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310
(1954).30 E.g., Ensign v. Walls, 323 Mich. 49, 34 N.W.2d 549 (1948); Forbes v.
City of Durant, 209 Miss. 246, 46 So. 2d 551 (1950).3 1 E.g., McClung v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 255 Ala. 302, 51 So. 2d
371 (1951).32 E.g., Hartung v. County of Milwaukee, 2 Wis. 2d 269, 86 N.W.2d 475
(1958).
[Vol. 75
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ment remedy.33 The remedy is inflexible, firmly embedded in the stare
decisis effect of voluminous case law. Nevertheless, nuisance con-
tinues to be the most popular remedy for air pollution because it
represents, under existing law, the best possible chance to gain com-
plete relief in one action. As long as this remains true, the nuisance
action, although of dubious value, will continue to be used.
B. Trespass
In a limited number of cases, air pollution victims have sought
a remedy through an action of trespass. Although avoiding some of
the problems inherent in a nuisance action, trespass is difficult to es-
tablish in most air pollution cases. Trespass is described as a physical
invasion or interference with the property of another.34 Since an
actual physical invasion is necessary, air pollution is difficult to bring
under trespass law, although some courts have allowed this action."
If a trespass is found, the courts do not "balance the equities," but
instead impose strict liability.36 Thus, if plaintiff can establish air
pollution as a trespass, he is entitled to injunctive relief plus damages
for injuries already suffered. However, the ability of the trespasser to
gain a prescriptive right 7 precludes recovery, for all practical pur-
poses, "in urban air pollution cases or others where the defendant
has continued to pollute for a long time."' 8
33 The Ducktown view of the function of nuisance is indicative of the
priorities that the courts have generally set: "Mhe law must make the best
arrangement it can between the contending parties, with a view to preserving
to each one the largest measure of liberty possible under the circumstances."
113 Tenn. at 367, 83 S.W. at 667 (emphasis added). The rights of the com-
munity at large are not considered.34 PROSSER, supra note 19, at 63-68.35E.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960) (invisible gases and particulates from de-
fendant's factory that settled upon and damaged plaintiff's land held to con-
stitute a trespass); Hall v. DeWeld Mica Corp., 244 N.C. 182, 93 S.E.2d 56
(1956) (dust settling on plaintiffs land held to constitute a trespass, but the
court's use of nuisance and trespass interchangeably indicates that it may have
failed to distinguish properly between the two).
36 The original common law trespass action allowed the plaintiff to recover
at least nominal damages regardless of whether he suffered any discernible
injury. Trespass on the case, which involved an indirect or accidental invasion
of another's property, required proof of actual damage. PROSSER, supra note
19, at 66. The Restatement of Torts has abolished the distinction between
direct and indirect invasions. The Restatement requirement for a trespass is
merely an actual entry of a person or thing upon the land of another. RESTATE-
mENr (SncoND) OF TORTS § 158, comment i at 278-79 (1965).
37For a discussion of prescriptive rights, see note 28, supra.38 Note, Legal Aspects of Air Pollution in Ohio 1971: Critiques and Pro-
posals, 40 U. Cm. L. Rv. 511, 517 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Legal Aspects
of Air Pollution in Ohio].
273
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C. Negligence
To maintain a negligence suit for an injury caused by air pollu-
tion, it is necessary to find the following elements:3"
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring
the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for
the protection of others against unreasonable risks.
2. A failure on his part to conform to the standard re-
quired....
3. A reasonable close causal connection between the con-
duct and the resulting injury ...
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of an-
other.
The standard of care is difficult to determine because of the uncer-
tainties of technological developments that can reduce pollution. It
may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to connect the damages
suffered with a particular polluter in a large city where many factories
and other sources contribute to the overall problem.40 Also, the de-
fenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence may be
available to the polluter.4' In any case, the recovery in negligence
actions is limited to damages and serves no valuable purpose in the
overall effort to improve the quality of the environment.
D. Strict Liability
The theory of strict liability for an ultrahazardous activity42 has
rarely been applied to air pollution cases. What few decisions exist
are split over the applicability of the doctrine to the emission of
dangerous gases.43 At any rate, successful cases are likely to be so
rare as to have a negligible effect on pollution control.
39 PROSSER, supra note 19, at 143.4OLegal Aspects of Air Pollution in Ohio, supra note 38, at 517-18.41 Furthermore, the statute of limitations may have run against the injured
party. In West Virginia, if a personal injury is involved, the applicable statute
is two years. W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 2, § 12 (Michie 1966).
42 Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.H.L. 330 (1868). The Restatement of Torts
uses the term "abnormally dangerous activity," and provides that contributory
negligence shall be no defense except where the plaintiff "voluntarily and un-
reasonably (subjects) himself to the risk of harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 484 (1965).43 In two similar cases brought for injuries caused by the escape of a dan-
gerous gas, the Delaware and California courts came to opposite conclusions.
In Fritz v. E. L duPont De Nemours & Co., 45 Del. 427, 438, 75 A.2d 256,
261 (1950), the court stated its belief that to hold any person or corporation
[Vol. 75
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Im. TOWARD A NEW REMEDY
A. Modem Theories
Resourceful attorneys, dissatisfied with the limitations of tradi-
tional remedies, have pursued new and innovative theories to gain
complete relief for victims of environmental pollution. Most of these
have, as yet, found little acceptance in the body of the law. Two,
however, bear mentioning as offering fresh possibilities for environ-
mental action.
The "public trust doctrine" was first advanced in 1892." Under
this theory, certain lands are held in trust for the people of the state.
The theory was originally applied to land beneath navigable waters 4
As applied to the environment, the "public trust doctrine" would
make government the trustee of "those valuable natural resources
which are not capable of self-regeneration and for which substitutes
cannot be made by man." 4 Thus, if the air is included as part of the
absolutely liable for possessing a dangerous substance or carrying on a haz-
ardous activity "would be but to strangle corporate and individual enterprise
in many well-recognized fields of endeavor." The opposite view was taken in
Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 498, 190 P.2d 1, 7 (1948), where the
court imposed absolute liability for an activity which "(a) necessarily involves
a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot
be eliminated by the exercise of utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of
common usage.'
4Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
45Id. The ownership of certain submerged land in the Chicago harbor
and consequent control of the waters above such land was conveyed to the
railroad by the illinois legislature. The State later brought suit to reclaim the
land. The Supreme Court held that the legislature was not competent to de-
prive Illinois of its ownership of such land:
That the State holds the title to the lands under the navigable
waters of Lake Michigan, within its limits, in the same manner that
the State holds title to soils under tide water, by the common law,
we have already shown, and that title necessarily carries with it con-
trol over the waters above them whenever the lands are subjected to
use. But it is a title different in character from that which the State
holds in lands intended for sale. It is different from the title which
the United States holds in public lands which are open to preemption
and sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that
they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruc-
tion or intereference of private parties.
Id. at 452.
The Court went on to note that Illinois could make improvements by
the erection of wharves, docks, piers, etc., so long as the public interest was
not impaired. But the Court denied the proposition that the state could convey
title and general control to land beneath the lake to a private party: 'The
control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as
to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein,
or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest
in the lands and waters remaining." Id. at 453.46 Cohen, The Constitution, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environ-
ment, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 388.
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public trust, no individual or corporation could pollute to the extent
that such pollution interferes with the individual citizen's property
right in a clean environment. As yet, however, the "public trust doc-
trine" has had little recognition in the area of environmental pro-
tection.
Also promising is the use of the ninth amendment" to create a
constitutional right to a clean environment. This theory is grounded
in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg in Griswold v.
Connecticut.48 Justice Goldberg found a guaranteed right to privacy
within the provisions of the ninth amendment. He went on to indicate
his belief that there are other fundamental rights not enumerated in
the Bill of Rights, but which fall within the penumbra of the enu-
merated rights and are equally worthy of protection. 4 A ninth amend-
ment right to clean air is still largely an academic proposition.
However, when taken together with the "public trust doctrine," there
is, at least, some promise for the environmentalist.
B. The Clean Air Amendments of 1970
This general survey of pollution law leads to the thesis of this
note - that the Clean Air Amendments of 197050 may provide the
first complete and effective judicial remedy for air pollution. The
"Citizen suits" provision' of the Amendments should be interpreted
to provide both injunctive relief and supplemental damages. Such a
remedy would provide the injured pollution victim with an adequate
avenue of relief. For this reason alone, an implied remedy is justified.
However, there is a more fundamental justification for the extraction
of an implied remedy from the "Citizen suits" provision. Since such
a remedy would provide, in one legal action, full compensation to the
victim of air pollution plus abatement of the offending source with-
out resort to such artificial tests as "balancing the equities," individ-
uals would be encouraged to avail themselves of the remedy. This,
in turn, would serve to effectuate the purpose of the Amendments -
the control of air pollution. Since the inclusion of the "Citizen suits"
provision clearly contemplates maximum utilization of individuals to
enforce the provisions of the Clean Air Act, a procedure that would
47 
'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CoNsr.
amend. IX.
48 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
49 Id. at 483.
5042 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
51 Id. h-2. For the text of this provision see note 62, Infra.
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serve to promote this concept can hardly be said to be outside of the
scope of the Amendments.
The 1970 Amendments are the latest step in a series of acts
that date back to 1955.52 The legislation acquired no significance until
amended extensively throughout the mid-1960s.53 The predecessors
to the present "Clean Air Act"51 4 used a conference system to abate
pollution." Following a series of administrative conferences, provision
was made for a hearing before a board appointed by the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare 6 and, finally, as a last resort, an
action in the district court, instituted by the Attorney General at the
request of the Secretary.57 No provision was made for any litigation
by private citizens.
The ineffectiveness of the enforcement provisions of the prior
Act is amply demonstrated by the only case decided by a court under
its provisions. In United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 8 the circuit
court settled a pollution problem that first arose eleven years earlier.
The controversy began in 1959 when the states of Maryland and
Delaware requested the Secretary to institute proceedings under the
Clean Air Act. A series of conferences and recommendations - all
without result - followed, and a public hearing was held in May of
1967. Bishop Processing Company was instructed to abate its emis-
sions by December 1, 1967. When the company continued polluting,
the Secretary filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
Maryland seeking an injunction. 9 After denial of its motion to dismiss,
Bishop Processing agreed to a settlement that it promptly ignored. The
Secretary then moved, pursuant to the settlement, for an order direct-
ing the defendant to cease operations. After a request for further evi-
dence was satisfied, the motion was granted. The company appealed
and the circuit court affirmed the order. Thus, eleven years after the
52 Act of July 14, 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322.53 Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485; Act of
Oct. 20, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992; Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub.
L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392.54The amended act was given the title "Clean Air Act" by section 14
of the Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, 401.
isAir Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108(d) (1), 81 Stat. 485.561d. § 108(f)(1).
671d. § 108(g).58 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1970), ajflg 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968). The
polluter in Bishop was a chicken processing plant near Bishop, Maryland. The
pollution consisted of alleged odors that moved across the state line to pollute
the air of Selbyvile, Delaware.
s9United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md.
1968).
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problem first arose, Bishop Processing was finally required to suspend
operations.
Certainly Bishop is illustrative of the need to make air pollution
legislation effective - a need recognized by Congress in 1970. Thus,
the Clean Air Amendments of 197060 attempted to put teeth into the
enforcement procedures. 6' The most significant provision of the
Amendments was the section allowing private citizens to initiate ac-
tions,62 after appropriate notice,63 against the alleged polluter or
against the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency64
to enforce the provisions of the Act. The provision creates no express
right to sue for damages supplemental to injunctive relief. 65 Neither,
however, does it specifically exclude such a remedy.66 If, therefore, a
remedy is fairly implied within the provisions and purposes of the Act,
6042 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
61 Senator Muskie, sponsoring the bill on the Senate floor, recognized past
inadequacies:
A nation which has been able to conquer the far reaches of space,
which has unlocked the mysteries of the atom, and which has an
enormous reserve of economic power, technological genius, and man-
agerial skills, seems incapable of halting the steady deterioration of
our air, water, and land.
The legislation we take up today provides the Senate with a
moment of truth: a time to decide whether or not we are willing to
let our lives continue to be endangered by the wasteful practices of
an affluent society, or whether we are willing to take the difficult but
necessary steps to breathe new life into our fight for a better quality
of life.
116 CONG. REc. S16,089-90 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
6242 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970). This section establishes the right of a
citizen to bring an action under the Clean Air Act.(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any
person may commence a civil action on his own behalf -(1) against any person (including (i) the United States,
and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency
to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B)
an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect
to such a standard or limitation, or(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a
failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Ad-
ministrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce
such an emission standard or limitation, or such an order, or to
order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case
may be.63 Sixty days notice must be given to the Administrator, the state and
the alleged polluter before instituting a civil action. Id. t h-2(b).
64Since 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency has administered the
Act. Prior to this time, enforcement was in the hands of the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare.6sSee the text of the "Citizen suits" provision in note 62, supra.
66Se text accompanying notes 87 and 88.
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then, absent a clear congressional intent to the contrary, the Amend-
ments should be construed in such fashion as to best accomplish their
ultimate objective - the control of air pollution.
1. The Precedents for an Implied Remedy
Interpreting the provisions and purposes of a legislative act so
as to create a civil remedy where none is expressly stated is not a new
legal concept. Courts have often found remedies within an act's pro-
visions where such remedies have been necessary to effectuate the
purposes for which the legislation was enacted. For example, implied
civil actions for injunctive relief and damages have been found within
the provisions of section 14a 7 and section 1068 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. The courts have reasoned that since the primary
purpose of that Act is to protect investors and since Congress did not
specifically deny private relief, such a remedy exists if the injured
party is a member of the class to be protected.69 More importantly, for
purposes of analogy to the Clean Air Act, the Supreme Court ob-
served that if federal jurisdiction were limited to declaratory relief,
the complainant would be compelled to seek remedial relief in the
state courts. The burden of bringing in all parties necessary for com-
plete relief in two separate actions might prove insuperable to the
complainant.70
67 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). In J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964), an action was brought by a shareholder of petitioner's company for
deprivation of his and other shareholder's preemptive rights by a merger alleg-
edly effected through the use of false and misleading proxy statements. The
Court determined that a private action could be maintained for recission or
damages, noting that a backup procedure was needed to supplement enforce-
ment by the Securities and Exchange Commission.68 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the defendant was accused of conspiracy to induce
plaintiffs to sell their stock for less than its true value. In allowing the action
to be maintained, the court, using reasoning similar to that of the Supreme
Court in Borak, cited the RE TATEmmNT OF ToRis § 286 (1938):
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited
act, or by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an
invasion of an interest of another if; (a) the intent of the enactment
is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other as an in-
dividual; and (b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is
intended to protect.
69 F. Supp. at 514.
It can be contended that the intent of the Clean Air Act is, at least in
part, to protect the rights of citizens to clean air and that one who violates
emissions standards established pursuant to the Act certainly violates this right.69E.g., J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). Similar reasoning
would seem applicable to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970): "(b)
The purposes of this subchapter are - (1) to protect and enhance the quality
of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare
and the productive capacity of its population . . .
70 377 U.S. at 434-35.
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Although implied civil remedies have most often been found in
the securities field, such relief has not been limited to that area.7' One
of the earliest and most significant examples of such court-created
remedies was derived from the provisions of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899.72 The Act was created solely to aid in
maintaining navigable waterways free of obstruction. Criminal sanc-
tions are provided, and the Attorney-General of the United States is
authorized to institute enforcement proceedings. 74 There is no express
provision for a private civil action.
In Neches Canal Co. v. Miller & Vidor Lumber Co.,7s the Fifth
Circuit allowed a private action for an injunction in equity, with at-
tendant damages, for a violation of the Act. The court held that the
plaintiff, "being the user of the navigable stream which was obstructed
in violation of the statute, was a beneficiary of the statute forbidding
its obstruction, and the remedy given by the statute was available in
behalf of (the plaintiff)."76 At least one circuit has taken a further
step. In Alameda Conservation Association v. California,77 the plain-
tiffs alleged that the defendant, Leslie Salt Company, intended to fill
and obstruct a great portion of San Francisco Bay in violation of
sections 401-406 of the Rivers and Harbors Act and asked for a
declaratory judgment on the validity of the state law under which the
filling was to be undertaken. Significantly, the plaintiffs alleged no
damage to navigation. Instead, the harms forecast included the de-
7' E.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). In implying a
civil remedy from the Federal Safety Appliance Acts, the Court set out the
following principle of statutory interpretation: "A disregard of the command
of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover
the damages from the party in default is implied .... ." Id. at 39.
72 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). For an in-depth treatment of the ramifications
of this act, see Note, Environmental Law-Private Cause of Action Under the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 for Injury to the Ecology of
Navigable Waters, 50 ThxAs L. REv. 1255 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Private
Cause of Action Under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act].
73 Briefly, the Act makes it unlawful to (1) construct bridges, dams, dikes,
or other similar obstructions over navigable waters without the consent of
Congress and approval of the Army Corps of Engineers and the Secretary of
the Army (33 U.S.C. § 401); (2) build wharves or piers, or excavate or fill
any port, harbor or navigable channel without the prior approval of the Army
Engineers and authorization by the Secretary of the Army (33 U.S.C. § 403);
and (3) discharge refuse into navigable waters, thereby impeding navigation
(33 U.S.C. § 407).
7433 U.S.C. § 406; 33 U.S.C. § 411.
7s24F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1928). The defendant dammed a navigable
stream, the waters of which were used by the plaintiff to operate a sawmill.
Thus, plaintiff's mill was forced to close down for a period of time with atten-
dant loss of profits. The court upheld plaintiff's right to sue in equity under
the Rivers and Harbors Act and awarded injunctive relief plus damages.76 Id. at 765.
77437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971).
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struction of fisheries and wildlife from which the plaintiffs personally
benefited and the destruction of the flushing characteristics of the
Bay with a consequent unfavorable effect on the climate of the area.
The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted, but the court denied the motion, holding that
the plaintiffs had alleged a violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act
that would cause them injury in fact. Therefore, the plaintiffs' clam,
if proved, was sufficient to entitle them to relief. Alameda, then, is
truly an innovative decision, extending the protection of the Rivers
and Harbors Act to purely environmental interests. 78
2. Standing
The "Citizen suits" provision of the Clean Air Act clearly con-
fers standing79 on private citizens to sue in the federal courts, at least
for abatement of pollution. The question of whether standing to sue
under a legislative act also confers a remedy for all injuries suffered
due to the act's violation appears to have been affirmatively answered
by the recent Supreme Court decision in Association of Data Pro-
cessing Service Organizations v. Camp. 0 Data Processing established
a two part test to determine standing: (1) Whether the plaintiff al-
leges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, eco-
nomic or otherwise; and (2) whether the interest sought to be pro-
tected is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by the
statute.8'
In Alameda, much the same test was used by the court to find
an implied remedy within the provisions of the Rivers and Harbors
Act. There, the plaintiffs alleged economic injuries (i.e. destruction of
fisheries from which they made their living) as well as environmental
injuries (i.e. climatic changes) and, thus, met the first test of Data
Processing. The second test- that the interest to be protected is
arguably within the zone of protection of the statute- was not ex-
pressly considered by the court. However, the Alameda court deter-
78The Alameda decision may have been influenced by a Fifth Circuit
decision earlier the same year. In Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971), the court held that the Secretary of the
Army could consider the ecology of navigable waters when deciding whether
to issue permits under the Act.
79The standing requirement seeks to test whether the party bringing the
action has a sufficient interest in the outcome to insure that the proceedings
will be conducted in a genuine "adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of judicial resolution." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101(1968).
80397 U.S. 150 (1970).
81 Id. at 153.
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mined that the purpose of the Rivers and Harbors Act- to protect
the use of navigable waters - need not be narrowly applied to the
actual navigation of those waters. 2 The court, in effect, acknowledged
that the second test of Data Processing had been met; the protection
of environmental qualities of navigable waterways is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected by the statute. Thus, the test
applied in Data Processing to determine standing was, in actuality,
the same test used in Alameda to find an implied remedy within the
provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act.
It has been argued that the Alameda decision does no more than
confer standing on the plaintiffs to assert their claims in the federal
courts and that no private cause of action is thereby created. 3 It
would appear, however, as at least one commentator has suggested,8"
that the definition of standing advanced in Data Processing forecloses
this objection. If the court finds that there has been an injury in fact
and that the alleged injured interest is arguably within the statute's
zone of protection, the prerequisites, not only of standing, but of the
right to a private cause of action have been satisfied. If this view is
correct, it would seem that there is no significant distinction between
standing and the right to a private cause of action.
Applying the above analysis to the Clean Air Act, it is certainly
arguable that where an individual has standing under the Act to sue
in the federal courts, that standing gives rise to an implied right to
maintain an action for complete relief for all injuries suffered due to
violation of the Act. The pollution victim must allege some personal
injury or damage to property to meet the first test. The second test
is easier to meet than in Alameda. The stated purpose of the Act is
"to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so
as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive
capacity of its population ... ."85 It is certainly arguable that an in-
dividual's right, at the very least, not to be injured by air pollution, is
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute. The "Citizen suits" provision clearly recognizes the existence
82 The interest sought to be protected by the statute "may reflect 'aesthetic,
conservational, and recreational' as well as economic values." 397 U.S. at 154.
This language extends the class of injury for which relief may be sought well
beyond purely personal or economic injuries and recognizes the trend toward
enlarging the class of individuals entitled to protest agency action. Id. at 154.83 This was the view of the Alameda case taken by the court in Guthrie
v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. Ala. 1971).84 Private Cause of Action Under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act, supra note 72, at 1259-63.8542 U.S.C. § 1857(b) (1970).
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of these two elements by expressly conferring standing to sue on
private citizens. Therefore, according to the test in Alameda, this
standing to sue should include the right to recover damages if the
injury is established. This result is clearly in line with the equitable
principle of providing complete relief in one action and is necessary
to facilitate the enforcement of the "Citizen suits" provision.
3. The Congressional Purpose
Assuming the existence of standing, there is nothing - absent a
firm showing of congressional intent to the contrary - to prevent con-
struction of the "Citizen suits" provision to provide a complete and
comprehensive air pollution remedy. The Act itself does not exclude
the remedy. The relevant language of the "Citizen suits" provision is
that "[tlhe district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce
such an emission standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order
the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case may be."86
Although this provision does not clearly express the right to a damage
remedy plus injunctive relief, it does not exclude such relief "very
clearly and plainly. 8 7 In fact, the term enforce, although often thought
to connote declaratory relief, includes the use of all remedies neces-
sary "to make effective" 8 the congressional purpose.
If such a supplemental damage remedy is to be held excluded,
there must be other language that shows Congress' clear intent to deny
such relief. The issue was raised during Senate consideration of the
Amendments,89 and it is apparent that certain Senators viewed a
damage remedy unfavorably. However, when considered in the light
of the total legislative history of the Act, no clear congressional intent
to exclude the remedy appears. Senator Muskie, in response to ques-
tions from the floor of the Senate, stated that the bill included an
express provision for injunctive relief, but none for damages.90 This
86 Id. h-2(a).87 The court in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.
Pa. 1946), created the requirement:
Of course, the legislature may withhold from parties injured the
right to recover damages arising by reason of violation of a statute
but the right is so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the law
that where it is not expressly denied the intention to withhold it
should appear very clearly and plainly.
Id. at 514 (emphasis added).88 BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 621 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).89E.g., 116 CoNG. Ruc. S16,089 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970); 116 CONG.
Rnc. 16,212 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970).
90 116 CONG. RIc. S16,116 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
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served to calm the fears of some senators that the problems inherent
in a damage suit would create great judicial inconvenience and back-
logs in the federal courts.92 Regardless of his express language, Senator
Muskie certainly contemplated making the Act effective: "Although
the committee does not advocate these [citizen] suits as the best way
to achieve enforcement, it is clear that they should be an effective
tool."9 2 Senator Hart, another sponsor of the Act, also clearly con-
templated extension of the "Citizen suits" provision to include dam-
ages: 93
Even if litigation is in fact expanded under this bill, it
must still be contended that such expansion is justifiable. As
Ramsey Clark also stated at the hearing previously referred
to (Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Natural Resources and
the Environment):
"There is no question that justice is denied in
America because it is delayed, and court backlogs
are a serious problem for society from every
standpoint. But society has to have priorities and
survival should be a pretty high priority. Survival
depends upon the protection of our environment,
and I think legal redress will be a major method
of protecting that environment. The imposition of
any additional caseload that might follow from
this bill on the courts is one that it must gladly
assume."
It seems possible that the drafters of the Clean Air Amendments
failed to include an express provision for a damage remedy because
of the fear of creating, by statute, a situation analogous to that which
9' Remarks of Senator Hruska, 116 CoNo. REO. S16,114-15 (daily ed.
Sept. 21, 1970).
92 116 CONG. Rec. S16,092 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). The House of
Representatives' viewpoint is reflected in language from H.R. Rep. No. 1146,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. - (1970); 3 U.S. CoDE CONG., & AD. NEws 5356 (1970):
The purpose of the legislation reported unanimously by your
committee is to speed up, expand, and intensify the war against air
pollution in the United States with a view to assuring that the air
we breathe throughout the nation is wholesome once again. The Air
Quality Act of 1967 (Public Law 90-148) and its predecessor acts
have been instrumental in starting us off in this direction. A review
of achievements to date, however, make abundantly clear that the
strategies which we have pursued in the war against air pollution
have been inadequate in several important respects, and the methods
employed in implementing these strategies often have been slow and
less effective than they might have been.
93 116 CONG. REe. S16,244 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970).
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exists in the area of nuisance. That is, they wished to avoid a "balanc-
ing of the equities" situation where the court could grant damages in
lieu of an injunction.9 4 If the Act were so construed, it would repre-
sent no improvement over the remedies available under the common
law. Thus, it is made clear under the Act that an injunction is manda-
tory for violation of pollution standards and that damages are not to
be substituted for abatement. On the other hand, the "Citizen suits"
provision should not be read to foreclose the award of supplemental
damages s to one who has proved such a violation and who has been
injured by it.96 In fact, the violation of the statute might reasonably
be held to create a standard of strict liability toward those whose
injuries result from its violation.97 In any case, litigants injured by air
pollution are unlikely to use the federal courts to enforce the Act if
they are then forced to sue again in the state courts for damages
stemming from the same cause of action. Certainly, this procedure
would tend to promote the very multiplicity of suits and backlog in
the courts that judicial economists so zealously decry.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law offers many prospective remedies to air pollution vic-
tims, but as history has shown and the condition of the environment
today amply illustrates, relief has been elusive or non-existent. It
seems clear that congressional legislation is the best hope of halting
94 Thus, unlike the view in Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron
Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904), the court is not to consider such
factors as the value of the polluter to the community.95 supplemental award of damages is consistent with equitable principles.
Where a court takes jurisdiction to grant equitable relief, it may retain juris-
diction to grant all relief justifiable under the circumstances. This policy is
reflected in the maxim, "[e]quity delights to do justice and not by halves."
G. CLARKP, PRINCIPLES oF EQUrITy 29 (1937).
96 The need for a supplemental damage remedy is, perhaps, most obvious
where a polluter, who is being sued under the "Citizen suits" provision, closes
down his operation and moves to another location where standards are less
stringently enforced. The purpose of the Act has clearly not been achieved,
because the polluter is still in operation, albeit in another location. The injured
pollution victim may not be able to get service on the polluter if he has moved
to another state (depending, of course, on the state of incorporation). If the
Clean Air Act is read to limit relief to an injunction, the complainant will have
no remedy. The knowledge that damages can be recovered against him under
the federal law may cause the polluter to decide that it will be less expensive
to curtail emissions than to move to a more favorable location.
97 The "Citizen suits" provision makes no distinction between intentional
and unintentional violations of emissions standards. The criminal liability is
to be imposed, regardless of intent, for a mere violation of the standards.
William Prosser has stated the principle that where a statute imposes an abso-
lute duty, the defendant may incur civil liability merely by violating the statute.
PRossER, supra note 19, at 197.
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environmental decay. But again, time has shown that regulatory acts
enforced by government agencies often fail to achieve their lofty
purposes. This has been particularly true in the field of air pollution.
The lack of enforcement of anti-pollution laws may be attributed in
part to economic pressures applied by large-scale polluters and in part
to understaffed and underfinanced enforcement agencies.
In short, pollution control by governmental action needs an
assist. Such an assist can be provided by the "Citizen suits" provision
of the Clean Air Act, if the provision is so interpreted as to have its
maximum effect. To encourage injured pollution victims to demand
enforcement of the Act, the "Citizen suits" provision should be inter-
preted to allow an individual who proves that a particular source is in
violation of emissions standards not only the satisfaction of seeing
the polluter closed down, but also monetary compensation adequate
to repair, as nearly as possible, the injuries he has suffered. Other-
wise, common law nuisance is likely to remain the most popular
remedy for the evils of air pollution with the attendant possibility of
a continued "balancing of the equities" in favor of allowing pollution
to continue, in contravention of the needs of society. The application
of a standard of strict liability for violations of the Act would do
much to negate the fears of judicial economists that such a remedy
will create a multiplicity of suits with impossible issues of proof. Even
if an increased burden is placed on the courts, there are times when
judicial convenience must yield to more important interests. The
citizen's role in air pollution litigation is essential to effective abate-
ment. To allow a complete and comprehensive remedy for injuries
due to air pollution would be a major step toward insuring that the
air we breathe is once again clear and free of the unnecessary by-
products of industrialization.
Joseph S. Beeson
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